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ABSTRACT 
We use the HOS model of international trade to find a link between trading (including 
domestic trading or retailing) costs and pattern of trade, not just its effect on volume of 
trade. Even if we use symmetric iceberg type  trading costs, unlike conventional unit cost 
approach, we generate relative price effects and prove that higher trading costs in labor-
abundant countries will restrict volume of world trade by working against factor 
endowment bias and conversely for the capital-abundant nation if the trading sector is 
labor intensive and vice versa. Asymmetric trading cost between goods may have 
paradoxical output effects. Relatively capital-abundant country will be worse off with 
increasing trading cost, whereas once engaged in trade the labor-abundant country may 
gain from further increase in trading cost. 
 
Keywords: International Trade, Factor-intensity, General equilibrium 
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1. Introduction 
  The purpose of this paper is to formalize the notion of trading costs (including 
domestic trading or retailing)1 in pure theory of international trade. We start from the 
basic Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) model of trade and explicitly bring in a trading 
or retailing sector which processes trading or transaction in the economy. This type of 
trading cost is modeled as the typical “iceberg” type of cost whereby a fraction of the 
value of output to be transacted is lost in the process if there are no traders in the system. 
The cost we have in mind may not be necessarily related to international trade or 
transportation of goods across the borders. Even in autarky domestic trading or 
transaction costs can alter allocation of resources and hence can affect pattern of trade. 
We highlight the total value of trade that is transacted in an economy which, by 
definition, must include total value of production in exportables and demand for the 
import competing good. Resources are needed to carry out trading and the lost value of 
output goes towards compensating the traders. Such resource costs may also include 
bureaucratic costs. The economy then divided into two segments, one where production 
takes place by using capital and labor a la the standard 2x2 model and the other where 
trading takes place also by using labor and capital. Therefore, it is essentially a 2X3 
model of trade.  Such a system is related to the earlier works by Jones and Marjit (1992), 
and Marjit and Beladi (1999) which draw from a well known policy paper by Gruen and 
Corden (1970). 
Most of the existing papers in the literature assume unit cost structure to capture 
the idea of only international trading cost. Hence it is easily understandable that if there is 
any change in trading and/or retailing cost that would naturally affect the relative prices, 
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direction of trade and volume of trade. Compared to those papers the merit of our work is 
that instead of assuming unit cost we start with symmetric iceberg costs with effects on 
relative prices and consequent changes in relative supply. In a very interesting paper on 
transport cost, Falvey (1976) emphasized on who is going to specialize in producing 
transport service which is required only for international trade (not for domestic trade). 
His main focus was on location decision regarding transport industry and consequent 
impact on standard trade theorems. This paper serves as a major workhorse in transport 
costs or trade costs related literature. In another elegant paper Cassing (1978) focuses on 
contrasting the shipping cost model with a non-traded goods model to examine the 
robustness of Stolper-Samuelson and Rybczynski theorems. Both Falvey (1976) and 
Cassing (1978) introduced a different sector to capture the idea of transportation costs. 
While we also introduce a third sector, our primary focus is how general transaction costs 
can affect volume and pattern of trade in differently endowed nations. We also highlight 
interesting welfare results. Starting from symmetric iceberg type transaction costs in the 
production sectors, we generate important relative price effects. This is a key point of the 
paper. 
Deardorff (2004) had also attempted to check the way through which the costs of 
trade, if it is large enough, affect the patterns of trade. Deardorff shows why and how 
trade cost does matter in selecting the trading partners and the goods to be exported and 
imported as well. But that was again international trading cost. 
  Whatever be the form and nature, trading costs adversely affect the volume of 
trade and limit the scope for international transaction have been amply demonstrated 
theoretically and empirically in several papers.2 On the other hand the impact of 
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communication cost on the pattern of trade is analyzed in recent works of Marjit (2007), 
Kikuchi (2006), Fink, Matto and Neagn (2005) .   
However, in this model our endeavor is to show that even in the absence of 
international trading or transportation costs domestic trading and/or retailing costs can 
affect the pattern of trade and the volume of trade as well. Our main objective is to 
internalize the concept of trading cost in an otherwise simple model of trade and 
emphasize the fact that trading as a separate activity uses resources like production 
related activities. Therefore, such cost should affect the pattern of trade and relative 
prices in a systematic way. The main results we derive in this context are as follows: 
(1) Trading costs tend to increase the relative price of the labor intensive good in autarky. 
Thus the volume of trade will be asymmetrically affected in a labor-abundant and 
capital-abundant country.3 
(2) Asymmetric product specific trading costs may have paradoxical output and relative 
price effects. For example larger trading costs for capital intensive good may actually 
increase the volume of production in capital intensive sector. However, the same for 
the labor intensive good must reduce production of the labor intensive good. 
(3) And perhaps, the most eye-catching outcome of this paper is that in the post-trade 
situation a decline in the trading costs may reduce welfare in a labor abundant country 
whereas welfare must go up for the capital rich nation. 
The model is developed in the next section. Section 3 discusses the relationship 
between trading costs and the pattern and volume of trade. Section 4 talks about the 
welfare impact. Last section concludes. 
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2. The basic model 
With this backdrop let us consider a world economy consisting of two economies: 
a home and a foreign economy. The variables of the foreign economy are denoted by 
asterisk. Foreign economy is considered in order to gauge the difference in relative price 
of foreign with that of home when trading cost changes. Our main focus is on the home 
economy. 
Home economy is considered to be a perfectly competitive one producing two 
tradeable goods; capital-intensive good X and labor-intensive good Y. Traders are needed 
to complete the process of transaction from production to consumption. A part of the total 
resource is absorbed in the production of X and Y, and others get employment due to 
transaction or trading activities. This transaction related intermediation gives rise to 
trading costs. Xα  is the fraction of good X and Yα  is the same for Y that is lost due to  
trading cost. Therefore, [ Xα  PXX + Yα PYY] represents the maximum total value of the 
goods that can be spent on those who are actually involved in trading activities. Let Z 
represent the sector and LZ, Kz are respectively labor and capital that are exclusively 
engaged in such operations. These factors are paid out of the difference between 
commodity price and material input cost of production. We assume competitive market 
for trading costs to be consistent with the otherwise standard specifications of the 
competitive general equilibrium model. 
Foreign economy is characterized by similar variables but with an asterisk. 
Perfect competition prevails in all markets in both the countries and production functions 
for X, Y and Z are assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale (CRS) and diminishing 
marginal productivity (DMP). 
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The symbols and basic equations are in consistence with Jones (1965). To build 
the system of equations, we use following notations: 
Pi = Price of ith good, i = X, Y ; w = Return to labor, L; r = Return to capital, K;  
ija = Technological co-efficient; K  = Total supply of capital; L  = Total supply of labor; 
Lz
 
= Labor engaged in trading activities; Kz
 
= Capital engaged in trading activities. 
Let us assume commodity Y as the numeraire and set Px = P.  
Competitive price conditions are: 
  ( )XParaw KXLX α−=+ 1..                        (1)                                      
( )YKYLY araw α−=+ 1..              (2) 
Full employment conditions are: 
 Kz.. −=+ KYaXa KYKX      (3) 
YaXa LYLX .. + = L - Lz      (4) 
Had there been no sector doing trading intermediation in the RHS of equation (3) and (4) 
we could have only K and L , respectively. 
Production function for trading activity is denoted by  
LzKz µ=        (5)4 
µ is assumed to be constant. We are not considering factor substitution in the trading 
sector. This is assumed for computational simplicity. 
 Note that, trading cost is required not for production. Trading cost comes into the 
picture only when the produced goods are brought to the consumers. Here X is 
importable and Y is exportable. This means in the post trade situation the cost equation 
for the Z sector would be  
[ Xα  P(X+M) + Yα (Y)] = rKzwLz +     
 8
Using condition (5) this can be re-written as  
[ Xα  P(X+M) + Yα (Y)] = ( )rwLz µ+    (6) 
Any imported amount of X, i.e. M and export of Y must be taken into account 
while calculating the total trading cost. Where,  [ ]1,0∈α ; a low α will mean lower the 
degree of trading costs and conversely. We start from autarky by using (6). In that case 
(6) boils down to  
 [ Xα  P(X) + Yα (Y)] = ( )rwLz µ+     (6a) 
We can close the model by incorporating a homothetic demand function. This is, 
  ( ) ( ) 0; <′= PfPf
Y
X
D
D
      (7)                    
  Here XD and YD signifies demand for respective commodities. 
 Factor endowments of labor and capital are constant at ,L  K . With given prices 
and trading costs (P, Xα  and Yα  ) w and r can be determined from equation (1) and (2). 
Factor proportions in turn get determined from factor prices because of CRS assumption. 
Now, let us start from some Lz and Kz (for any given value of Lz, Kz can also be 
determined from (5)) such that )( KzK − and )( LzL − are positive. Then, given ( ,w r) and 
hence aijs ( ija is constant because of CRS) and with a given value of Lz (and hence Kz) we 
can solve for X and Y from equation (3) and (4). This completes the solution of the 
model.  
Moreover, we can also solve for Lz and Kz. With w and r determined the RHS of 
(6a) would be linear in Lz with slope (w+µr). Given P with an increase in Lz LHS of (6a) 
must fall as productive5 resources are smaller in size now. This implies that new 
production equilibrium at the given price level would be on a lower production 
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possibility frontier6, yielding lower value of production. Thus LHS of (6a) is negatively 
sloping in Lz or Kz. Hence, we have   figure -1 where LZ0 (and hence KZ0) is determined. 
Now with LZ0 or KZ0 we can determine everything else in the system, in particular X and 
Y or 





Y
X
. 
 
3. A  Price Effect on Supply 
With a rise in P, w will fall and r will go up as per the Stolper-Samuelson 
theorem. Given LZ and Kz, this will make the labor constraint more and capital constraint 
less binding. Hence due to Rybczynski theorem X will go up and Y will go down 7.  
Now, let us look at (6a). What is going to happen to the RHS of equation (6a) that 
crucially depends on the value of µ. RHS would increase (decrease) if the value of µ 
happens to be greater (lower) than unity. However, due to the envelope property and also 
for the fact that trading cost is the same for both sectors, change in [ Xα  P(X) + Yα (Y)]  
will be approximated by dP.X which is greater than zero since P rises. Hence, the LHS in 
figure-1 will shift up. This is demonstrated in figure -2. If Z sector really uses more labor 
relative to capital (µ<1), due to an increase in P RHS of (6a) will fall and Lz (or Kz) will 
unambiguously increase. Therefore LZ will increase further curtailing Y and increasing X. 
Thus a rise in P will raise 





Y
X
, the usual supply-side response. By using the homothetic 
demand function we can close the model and can determine the equilibrium value of P. 
Figure-3 gives us the equilibrium autarkic price PA. Nevertheless, when Z turns out to be 
more capital using, eventual effect on Lz or Kz depends on the relative strength of change 
in the LHS and RHS. Therefore, the supply side response is quite interesting. Relatively 
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labor-intensive Z would end up with higher supply of (X/Y), the conventional response. 
This may take place even in case of capital-intensive Z if the effect on LHS is stronger 
than that of RHS. When two effects are exactly offsetting a rise in P will result in higher 
(X/Y) a la Rybczynski argument through more binding labor constraint and less binding 
capital constraint. On the other hand when Lz (and/or Kz) falls we need to weigh the first 
round Rybczynski effect with the second round offsetting effect on (X/Y). 
The underlying economic intuition is very easy to tackle with. The first round 
impact on (X/Y) is at a given Lz or Kz. Here (X/Y) must increase. As (X/Y) goes up, 
trading activity should also change. But which one would be used more in this so-called 
“unproductive” trading sector that would be determined by the specific type of 
production function that we assumed. How much labor and capital could be released and 
how much of those factors could be further employed for trading that is determined by 
the value of constant µ. This is the main driving force of our results in this paper. 
Nonetheless, let us assume that trading sector uses more labor relative to capital and thus 
Lz and/or Kz should go up consequent upon an increase in P and hence (X/Y) should rise 
further by curtailing Y and increasing X8. 
Let us introduce a foreign economy, represented by ‘*’. Say both domestic and 
foreign economies are similar in technology and preference. But the difference lies in 
factor endowments. Let the foreign economy be capital abundant. Hence,  (K/L)* > (K/L). 
When both the nations are symmetrically affected by trading costs, according to HOS 
prediction, for a given P, (X/Y)* > (X/Y). This implies, PA*<PA (suffix ‘A’ denotes 
autarkic situation). It is apparent that greater is the difference between (K/L)* and (K/L) 
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and hence (PA - PA*), bigger will be the volume of trade or the size of so called “trade 
triangle”. 
Here it is worth mentioning that as far as the domestic production, domestic 
exports and domestic imports are concerned, intermediation is done only by domestic 
labor and capital.  
 
3. B  Symmetric change in domestic trading costs 
Suppose there is a change in trading costs in the home country owing to some 
reasons. Say both Xα  and Yα  rise.  Therefore, both ( )Xα−1  and ( )Yα−1  fall in the 
home, the labor-abundant country. Note that from (1) and (2) given P there will be 
symmetric response in both the price equations,  0ˆˆ <= rw  [‘^’ denotes proportional 
change as in Jones (1965)]. Hence, 





r
w does not change. However, there are two effects 
on LHS in (6a). Given [PX +Y], an increase in trading cost has increased LHS. But as w 
and r fall, value of national income goes down. Hence given Xα  and Yα , LHS should go 
down.  The negative effect will vanish if we start from zero trading costs. To keep things 
simple we shall assume that initially Xα  = Yα =0 9. Then the RHS falls at a given Lz (or 
Kz) as w and r fall. Therefore, Lz (or Kz)
 
must increase lowering Y and increasing X.10 
Subsequently a symmetric increase in Xα  and Yα  will lead to an increase in Lz (or Kz) 
and an increase in 





Y
X
. This will reduce the gap between 





Y
X *
 and 





Y
X
 for any given 
P. The autarkic price gap (PA – PA*) will also shrink and so will be the volume of trade. 
This is clearly demonstrated in figure-3.  
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Therefore as both Xα  and Yα  rise in a labor abundant country, relatively less 
labor compared to capital (since both productive L and K fall and Z is more labor using) 
is available for production related activities cutting back production of labor intensive 
good and increasing that of capital intensive one. It is also to be noted that there is no 
presumption as to which sector is more distorted by trading cost with Xα  and Yα  being 
the same. If trading intermediation requires more labor than capital, the labor-abundant 
country suffers much in terms of the good over which it has comparative advantage. The 
message is that resources that could otherwise be involved in producing X and Y are 
being engaged in intermediation activities. Therefore, the trading related transaction cost 
induced bias goes against the factor-endowment bias for a relatively labor-abundant 
country. Due to the same reason for a capital-abundant country’s natural endowment bias 
is further strengthened by trading cost. Precisely that is why and how the relative price 
and volume of trade gets asymmetrically affected for labor-rich and capital-rich 
countries.  
Equation (6) provides with the following expression 
( )
rw
rrww
zL Yx VV YX
µ
µαα αα
+
+
−++=
.ˆ.ˆ
 Pˆ ˆ ˆˆ    (8) 
Here   ( )( ) YMXP
MXP
YX
X
xV
αα
αα
++
+
=  and ( ) YMXP
Y
YX
Y
YV
αα
αα
++
=   
xVα  and YVα  are essentially the value share of trading cost in X and Y, 
respectively with respect to total trading cost. A closer look reveals that these are nothing 
but the share of X and Y that requires trading intermediation. Note that this includes both 
consumption and production and 1=+ YVV X αα . 
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 Using the elasticity of demand and setting Xα  = Yα  = α  and setting 
0ˆˆ == KL one can easily arrive at the following results. 
 
( ) αλλ
σλ dP LZKZD −−=
1)(ˆ       (9) 
Here both 0<λ  because commodity X is capital intensive. Therefore, what would 
happen to the volume of trade due to an increase in trading or distribution cost that 
crucially depends on as to ( )LZKZ λλ − is positive or negative, i.e Z requires more capital or 
not. When Z uses more labor ( )LZKZ λλ − <0, autarkic equilibrium price must decrease for 
both labor-abundant and capital-rich countries implying a decrease or an increase in the 
trade triangle for the countries, respectively. 
Thus the following proposition is immediate, 
 PROPOSITION I : An increase in trading costs tends to make the labor intensive good 
dearer in autarky because of less production. This in turn will reduce the volume of trade 
in a labor-abundant country but will enhance the same in capital-abundant country.         
       QED 
 
Proof: See appendix A for detailed mathematical proof. 
 
3. C  Asymmetric change in domestic trading costs 
           We can have some interesting outcome if trading costs do not change 
symmetrically. Two interesting papers in this connection deserve to be mentioned. One is 
by Chakrabarti (2004) and the other is by Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006). There may 
be two different cases in our model: one is when trading cost increases in capital-
intensive goods and the other when labor-intensive goods are disturbed by greater trading 
costs. 
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           Say trading cost increases in X while that of Y remains constant. From (1) RHS 
goes down as  Xαˆ  >0. This leads to an increase in w and a fall in r since X is capital-
intensive. Given Lz (and Kz), capital constraint will be more and labor constraint will be 
less binding. Therefore, production of Y will increase and that of X will fall following the 
standard Rybczynski effect. For a given Lz (and Kz), RHS of (6a) would increase if Z is 
using more labor than capital. LHS of (6a) also increases as Xα  goes up. Hence the 
effect on Lz is uncertain. When trading cost increases only in X, for a given P and given 
trading cost for Y equation (8) comes down to 
                     
rw
rrww
zL xVX µ
µαα
+
+
= −
ˆ.ˆ
ˆ ˆ
    
( )








−
−
−
++
+
= rwrw
rw
zL
X
X
X
X LYKY
xVX µ
α
α
θ
θ
α
α
θ
θµ
µ
αα
11
ˆ
ˆ
  (10) 
Whether the value of Lz would increase or not that is not unambiguous. Lz would 
increase iff, 
( ) wrrw
X
X
X
X KYLY
xV
α
α
θ
θµ
α
α
θ
θµα
−
>








−
++
11
   (11) 
             Here the LHS of (11) is likely to be greater than the RHS. The intuitive 
explanation is very simple. The Xα  may be tiny. If the volume of consumption of X is 
sufficiently large, xVα  must not be insignificant and at the same time Y is labor-
intensive relative to X. Sufficiently large consumption of X implies that if trading cost 
goes up in X, it will require a major chunk of labor and capital to take care of this trading 
cost related intermediations. Note that as Z sector uses more labor than capital Lz would 
increase more than Kz. In that case production of Y should suffer and that of X should 
rise a la Rybczynski argument. 
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 From the full employment conditions and assuming constant L and K we get, 
                 =Xˆ  ( )[ ] zLKYLZLYKZ ˆ  1 λλλλλ −     (12) 
               Therefore Xˆ  would be positive if condition (11) is satisfied and Z turns out to 
be more labor intensive than Y since λ <0. The precise condition looks like
KY
LY
KZ
LZ
λ
λ
λ
λ
> . 
This is a bit different from the simple labor intensity assumption for Z what we assumed 
earlier. This condition implies Z must be most labor intensive among X, Y and Z. 
Therefore the factor intensity ranking condition seems to be
KX
LX
KY
LY
KZ
LZ
λ
λ
λ
λ
λ
λ
>> , then only 
X will rise. However, if 
KY
LY
KZ
LZ
KX
LX
λ
λ
λ
λ
λ
λ
<< , then simple more labor using assumption of Z 
is still valid but X would in fact fall. This possibility should not be ignored as still Z uses 
more labor than X which was our primary assumption. Hence the effect on X is 
ambiguous with the real possibility of an increase in output due to increase in trading cost 
in X. However, one can check that under the same condition 0ˆ <Y  when .0ˆ >X  . 
          On the other extreme trading cost may increase only in Y. From (2) RHS goes 
down as  Yαˆ  >0. This reduces w and increases r since Y is labor-intensive. This in turn, 
for any given Lz and Kz, lead to an increase in X and a fall in Y. For a given Lz and/or 
Kz, RHS of (6a) should go down as µ is less than unity. LHS of (6a) increases as Yα  
goes up. Hence Lz should increase unambiguously. Then following Rybczynski theorem 
Y production should fall and that of X should increase. Under these circumstances, when 
trading cost increases only in Y, for a given P and given trading cost for X equation (8) 
can be modified as 
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rw
rrww
zL YVY µ
µαα
+
+
= −
ˆ.ˆ
ˆ ˆ
    
( )








−
+
−
−+
+
= rwrw
rw
zL
Y
Y
Y
Y LXKX
YVY µ
α
α
θ
θ
α
α
θ
θµ
µ
αα
11
ˆ
ˆ
  (13) 
zLˆ >0 iff ( ) rwrw
Y
Y
Y
Y LXKX
YV µ
α
α
θ
θ
α
α
θ
θµα
−
>








−
++
11
  (14) 
Above condition is likely to hold true when sufficient amount of Y is traded for 
consumption and as X is capital-intensive compared to Y. 
Therefore change in Y could be represented by the following expression for given L, K, P 
and Xα ,                 ( )[ ] zLY LXKZKXLZ ˆ  1ˆ λλλλλ −=    (15) 
 Yˆ  would be negative if condition (14) is satisfied and Z happens to be more labor 
intensive than X since λ <0. The precise condition would read as
KX
LX
KZ
LZ
λ
λ
λ
λ
> . 
Assumption of labor intensive Z entails that, at least, it has to be more labor intensive 
than the most capital intensive one. For some reason if Z becomes even more labor 
intensive than Y, Yˆ  must be negative. Thus negative effect on Y is unambiguous. 
Hence we can write down the following proposition: 
PROPOSITION II: Larger trading costs for capital intensive good may raise the volume of 
production of capital intensive good whereas the same for the labor intensive good 
unequivocally reduces the production of the labor intensive good.   QED 
         
  
Proof: See appendix A for detailed mathematical proof. 
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4. Welfare implications 
  So far we have not explicitly stated the welfare consequences of introducing 
trading costs in the standard general equilibrium model. Having a leakage in the form of 
trading costs related transaction activity entails inefficiency of some sort. Trading or 
distribution costs, in fact, act as a tax on the productive sector. More tax is envisaged on 
the labor intensive good because of the assumed production function for trading activity. 
In the first best situation the economy should have produced more of the labor-intensive 
good. If the labor-abundant country wishes to engage in trade, prevalence of trading costs 
will restrict volume of trade and therefore the extent of the gains from trade will be 
affected. Thus the welfare loss is reinforced. Higher (lower) trading costs in a labor–
abundant country will be harmful to the capital-abundant country since higher output of 
capital intensive good will depress (increase) world price of that good, causing a terms of 
trade loss (gain) for the capital-abundant country. Thus a reduction in trading costs will 
unequivocally raise the welfare of capital-rich nations. Interestingly once engaged in 
trade, the labor-abundant economy may gain (lose) from higher (lower) trading costs, 
through an improvement (deterioration) in the terms of trade. Then, we may have a case 
where the labor-abundant country in the post-trade situation can even gain (lose) from 
higher (lower) trading costs with a strong enough terms of trade effect. This is evident 
from the following expression for change in welfare. 
 PM
d
dMP
d
dXP
d
dYM
d
dP
d
d
++





++−−=
Ω
α
α
αα
α
αα
)1()(                    
Since M = XD – X and M = M(Ω, P)  






+





++






∂
∂
+−−
−
=
Ω PM
d
dXP
d
dY
P
MPM
d
dP
d
d
X αα
αα
ααα β )1(1
1
                (16) 
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where, Xβ  =
Ω∂
∂MP  or marginal propensity to import. Note that 
P
M
∂
∂
 is nothing 
but the substitution effect. 
PROPOSITION III: A capital-abundant country’s welfare must increase with a reduction in 
the trading costs in the post-trade situation whereas the labor-abundant nation may 
experience a reduction in its welfare.      QED 
Proof:  Appendix B provides with the detailed calculation. 
 
5. Conclusion  
The purpose of this paper is to model general trading cost within a simple general 
equilibrium framework and then explain the relationship between international trade and 
trading costs or distribution costs. We argue that the standard HOS framework provides 
some insights regarding such a relationship. Trading is a labor-intensive activity. Hence, 
as more labor is attracted to this sector, labor-intensive traded good suffers, so does the 
volume of trade for the labor-abundant economy.  
 
Appendix  A 
Differentiating and manipulating equation (1) and (2) we get, 
( )
θ
αα
α
θ
ααα
α
θ
YY
Y
XXX
X
KXKY PP
w
ˆ.
1
.ˆ
ˆˆ
1
ˆ
−
+−−
−
=      (1.A) 
( )
θ
αα
α
θ
ααα
α
θ
YY
Y
XXX
X
LXLY PP
r
ˆ.
1
.ˆ
ˆˆ
1)(ˆ −
+−−
−
−=      (2.A) 
Where, θ = (θKY – θKX) = ( )LYLX θθ −  < 0 .  And,  ⇒jiθ  value share of jth factor in ith 
commodity, j = L and K, and i= X and Y. 
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 Therefore,  ( ) 



−
+
−
−=−
Y
Y
Y
X
X
XPrw
α
α
α
α
α
α
θ 1
ˆ
1
ˆ
ˆ
1
ˆˆ
    (3.A) 
Differentiating equation (3) and (4) and manipulating them one gets, 
λ
λλλλλλ KYLZLYKZLYKY zLzKKLX
ˆˆˆˆ
ˆ
−+−
=      (4.A) 
λ
λλλλλλ LXKZKXLZKXLX zKzLLKY
ˆˆˆˆ
ˆ
−+−
=      (5.A) 
Note that here zKKYKXLZLYLX λλλλλλ ++==++ 1  
Where, λ = (λKY – λLY) + (λLY λKZ –λKY λLZ)  = ( ( )KZLXLZKXKXLX λλλλλλ −+− )  < 0 .  
Because λLY > λKY  and λKX > λLX and the second bracketed terms of both the inequalities 
are net of multiplications of two fractions which are not likely to outweigh the first 
bracketed negative terms of the said inequalities. And, ⇒jiλ  share of jth factor in ith 
commodity, j = L and K, and i= X, Y and Z. 
 
Therefore, 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )λ λλλλλλ LYLXKZKYKXLZ zKKzLLYX +−−+−=−
ˆˆˆˆ
ˆˆ
                 (6.A) 
If we differentiate equation (5) taking µ as constant one gets,  
zLzK ˆˆ = .         (7.A) 
From equation (6a of main text), 
( )
rw
rrww
zL YVV YX x µ
µααα α
+
+
−++=
ˆ.ˆ
 Pˆ ˆ ˆˆ      (8.A) 
Here,  xVα  and YVα  represent share of trading costs in X and Y respectively. 
Using homothetic demand and balanced trade condition we have, 
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( )( ) ( )( ){ }LYLXKZKYKXLZ zKKzLLP
D
λλλλλλ
σλ +−−+−−=
ˆˆˆˆ
1)(ˆ   (9.A) 
where, Dσ  implies demand elasticity. 
When trading costs change symmetrically across sectors Xα  = Yα  = α  equation 
(8.A) turns out to be 






+==  Pˆ 
-1
)ˆ(ˆ ˆ xVzKzL α
α
αα     ( )1=+ YVV X ααQ    (10.A) 
When labor and capital endowments are held fixed and there is no autonomous change in 
P equation (9.A) boils down to 
( )( ) ( )( ){ }
( ) ( ){ }[ ]
( ) ( ){ }[ ]
( ) ( )
α
αλλ
σλλλσλ
λλλλ
σλ
λλλλλλ
σλ
λλλλλλ
σλ
α
-1
1)(ˆ,  ˆ1)(ˆ, 
   11ˆ1)(ˆ,
ˆ
1)(ˆ,
ˆˆ
1)(ˆ
ˆLZKZLZKZ
KZLZLZKZ
KYKXLZLYLXKZ
LYLXKZKYKXLZ
DD
D
D
D
PorzLPor
zLPor
zLPor
zLzLP
−−=−−=
−−−−=
+−+−=
+−−+−−=
 
Thus ( ) αλλ
σλ dP LZKZD −−=
1)(ˆ       (11.A) 
Here it is important to mention that we have assumed zero trading or distribution cost to 
start with. This is precisely why we get αd in stead of 
α
αα
-1
ˆ . 
 This proves proposition I. 
When trading costs change asymmetrically - there may be two cases: (a) YX αα ˆˆ 0 =>  
and (b) XY αα ˆˆ 0 =>  . Substituting these conditions in the above equations one can 
easily arrive at the proposition what we have written in the text. 
 Hence proposition II is proved. 
 21
Appendix  B 
The utility function is ( )DD YXUU ,=       (1.B)  
Differentiating above equation we get, DD PdXdYd +=Ω    (2.B)   
Ωd  denotes the change in real income or welfare in Y units.  
We also know that the budget constraint is, 
( ) rKzwLzKzKrLzLwKrLwPXY DD ++−+−=+=+ )(   
DD PXY + = ( )( ) ( )[ ]YMXPYPX ++++− αα1     
DD PXY + = ( )PMYPX α++         (3.B)    
Therefore, PM
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)()1()(   (4.B) 
Since M = XD – X and M = M(Ω, P). 
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where, Xβ  =
Ω∂
∂MP . 
Note that 
P
M
∂
∂
 signifies normal substitution effect and Xβ  is the marginal 
propensity to import. 
We know that 
 0<
αd
dP
, 
P
M
∂
∂
<0 because of negativity of substitution effect 
and 





+
αα d
dXP
d
dY
 is also negative as a rise in trading cost leads to lowering the value of 
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total production for a given P. However, ( )Xβα−1 >0 since 1,0 << Xβα . Therefore, if α  
falls, change in welfare would go in favor of a capital-rich nation as substitution effect is 
very unlikely to offset all other positive effects. Whereas for a labor–rich country welfare 
implication is ambiguous. It may fall if terms of trade effect is relatively weaker. 
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Footnote 
1. Trading does not necessarily mean international transportation or trading. In order to make 
the produced goods available for consumption the same needs to be reached from producers 
to consumers. At least this domestic, if not international, trading needs some cost which is 
what we shall focus on in the current paper. Therefore we shall interchangeably use the terms 
trading cost, domestic trading cost, retailing coast or distribution cost to indicate the cost of 
transferring goods from producers to consumers. 
 
2. Interested readers may look at Anderson (2000), Anderson and Wincoop (2004), 
Davis (1998), Trefler (1995), Laussel and Riezman (2008), Bandopadhyay and Roy 
(2007), Bernard, Jensen and Schoot (2006), Limao and Venables (2001). However, a 
considerable part of trading cost may be bureaucratic corruption and rent seeking. There are a 
large number of papers that deal with these issues.  
 
3. This crucially depends on the intensity assumption of the trading activity. 
 
4. Per unit trading of X and Y require both labor and capital. This is because of the nature of 
trading cost, iceberg type that we assumed here. 
 
5. Here by productive resources we mean labor and capital employed in producing X and Y but 
not used for the trading services. Z sector’s labor and capital are not unproductive in a finer 
sense as without this service production of X and Y becomes useless. However, in terms of 
goods production their marginal productivities are zero though they get some pecuniary 
benefits. Hence, in tune with Bhagwati (1982) this segment of resources can be considered as 
Directly Unproductive Profit seeking activities (DUP). 
 
6. Note that this is not the Rybczynski effect. Since available productive resources shrink, PPF 
moves down. 
 
7. Interested readers may look into Jones, R. W (1965) for more detailed analysis and 
mathematical calculations. 
 
8. When both Lz and Kz fall the reverse outcome would be there and we need to compare 
between first round positive effect with second round negative effect. Again when Lz and/or 
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Kz remain same (X/Y) should increase eventually due to first round positive Rybczynski 
effect. 
 
9. Initial trading cost may not be necessarily 0. Without losing the essence of the model we can 
think of any positive value of Xα  and Yα  to start with. In that case the value of Pˆ  would 
be (assume that Xα  = Yα  = α ) ( )
α
αλλ
σλ α -1
1)(ˆ ˆLZKZ
D
P −−= . If we start from zero 
trading cost, α  =0 and 
α
αα
-1
ˆ
 would be dα .  One can check that this will provide us with 
the same result. 
 
 
10.  For a constant and given µ from equation (5) we get, zLzK ˆˆ = . 
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     Figure -1 
 
Determination of equilibrium Lz or Kz for given P and Trading costs 
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     Figure -2 
 
Effect of a change in P on Lz or Kz when Z sector uses relatively more labor 
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Figure-3 
 
Determination of autarkic equilibrium prices in home and foreign countries and effect 
of an increase in trading costs at home, labor-rich economy 
 
 
